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Abstract 
 
There is a long-standing debate about the special nature of banks. Based on a unique 
dataset of legislative changes in industrial countries, we identify events that strengthen 
competition policy, analyze their impact on banks and non-financial firms and explain the 
reactions observed with institutional features that distinguish banking from non-financial 
sectors. Covering nineteen countries for the period 1987 to 2004, we find that banks are 
special in that a more competition-oriented regime for merger control increases banks’ 
stock prices, whereas it decreases those of non-financial firms. Moreover, bank merger 
targets become more profitable and larger. A major determinant of the positive bank 
returns, after controlling inter alia for the general quality of institutions and individual bank 
characteristics, is the opaqueness that characterizes the institutional setup for supervisory 
bank merger reviews. Thus strengthening competition policy in banking may generate 
positive externalities in the financial system that offset unintended adverse side effects on 
efficiency introduced through supervisory policies focusing on prudential considerations 
and financial stability. Legal arrangements governing competition and supervisory control 
of bank mergers may therefore have important implications for real activity. 
 
Keywords: specialness of banks, mergers and acquisitions, competition policy, legal institutions, financial 
regulation. 








Many academic researchers, policy makers and market practitioners regard banks as “special” 
firms. The literature justifies this view and the related sector-specific regulations with 
potential instability, informational asymmetries in the provision of credit and the key role the 
financial sector plays in the economy. For the same reasons competition is regarded with 
greater caution than is the case for other sectors. An emerging new literature, however, throws 
a more positive light on competition in the banking sector. 
 
The present paper attempts to shed some new light on this debate by looking at the role legal 
and other institutional arrangements play in governing the review of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). It is asked first whether legal changes strengthening competition policy have the 
same or differential effects on banks and non-financial firms. Second, differential effects on 
banks are explained with institutional features of the merger review process specific to the 
banking sector. In fact, bank mergers are subject to a supervisory review exhibiting 
institutional features unknown in more regular sectors. 
 
One important contribution of the paper is the presentation of a unique data set of legislative 
changes affecting the reviews of M&As in 19 industrial countries (United States, Canada and 
seventeen European countries) between 1987 and 2004. The data set covers the introduction 
of competition laws and competition authorities (both in banking and other sectors) as well as 
changes in the relative responsibilities of competition and supervisory authorities in bank 
merger reviews. 
 
The analysis finds striking differences between the impact of legislative changes on banks and 
firms. Legislative changes strengthening competition policy decrease the market valuations of 
firms, but increase the market valuations of banks. The decrease in the valuations of firms is 
expected: A more proactive competition policy and consequently more intense competition 
should lead to the erosion of profits, an effect predicted by standard industrial organization 
theories. In contrast, a merger review policy oriented more towards competition has a non-
standard positive effect on bank stocks and also on the profitability and size of bank merger 
targets. A key issue is which features specific to banking explain this special reaction by 
banks. 
 
A cross-section analysis of the cumulative abnormal bank stock returns identifies the 
variables that drive the positive reaction. We pay particular attention to the different 
regulatory framework faced by banks compared to non-financial firms, namely that bank 
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mergers are not only subject to competition reviews but also to supervisory reviews. One key 
feature of the institutional setup for supervisory bank merger reviews is whether the results 
are published or not. (Competition reviews are public in all countries of our sample.) Our 
estimations suggest that the less transparent the supervisory reviews in a given country are, 
i.e., when the supervisory decisions are not published, the higher the valuation gains of banks. 
This result is robust to controlling for a host of individual bank and country-specific variables, 
including the quality of other economic institutions. 
 
The results suggest that the effects of the reorientation of the legal and institutional 
environment towards more competition in banking will be heavily influenced by the 
supervisory regime. In particular, supervisory reviews of bank mergers are often guided by 
other objectives and approaches than competition reviews. They typically focus on the 
soundness and stability of the new entity created. Moreover, supervisory intervention 
occasionally promotes specific mergers in order to save weak or failing banks. As a result, 
these interventions are usually not driven by competition and efficiency considerations. And 
this may be even more so in less transparent supervisory systems. Investors will penalize 
banks for these sources of inefficiency with a lower valuation. As competition reviews gain 
importance and as the supervisory setup becomes more transparent, the room for less 
efficiency-oriented transactions vanishes and bank valuations may increase. 
 
In other words, the strengthening of competition policy seems to generate important positive 
externalities in the financial system that limit supervisory discretion in determining merger 
outcomes and thereby offset unintended adverse side effects on efficiency introduced through 
supervisory policies focusing on prudential considerations and financial stability. In this light, 
the paper also presents case studies for events around the widely discussed ABN 
Amro/Antonveneta and Crédit Agricole/Crédit Lyonnais merger transactions, which were 
followed by sweeping legislative changes. More generally, legal arrangements governing 
competition and supervisory control of bank mergers seem to have important implications for 
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July 2007I.  Introduction 
A widely held view among academic researchers, policy makers and market practitioners 
is that “banks are special”. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, 
Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1998) and Herring and Litan (1995), for example, list potential 
instability, informational asymmetries in the provision of credit and the key role the 
financial sector plays in the economy as three reasons why banks may deserve a unique 
regulatory treatment. It is widely observed that the strong desire for public intervention 
tends to bring about cautious or even negative attitudes towards competition in this sector 
(Keeley (1990), Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000)). Recent work, however, has started 
to question the idea that banking competition is always something baneful (Boyd and De 
Nicolo (2005), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006), Claessens and Laeven (2005)). 
The present paper attempts to shed some new light on this debate by looking at the role 
legal and other institutional arrangements play in governing the review of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). We ask whether changes in the legal setup for competition policy 
have the same or differential effects on banks and non-financial firms and why. More 
specifically, we analyze changes in market valuations of banks and firms in response to the 
recent general strengthening of competition aspects in merger reviews and try to explain the 
differences in the reaction of individual bank stocks with institutional features of the merger 
review process specific to the banking sector. Indeed, because of the sector specialness 
bank mergers are also subject to a supervisory review, exhibiting institutional features 
unknown in more regular sectors.
1 
                                                 
1 See e.g. the “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS (1997)). Core principles 4 and 5 state that supervisors must have the authority to review 
and reject any changes in bank ownership or to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or 
investments by a bank. 
7
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By investigating the specialness of banks from this angle, we study an area that has 
generated major policy debates and public concerns recently, but may have attracted scant 
academic attention. For example, some major US banks have now gained such large market 
shares that law forces them to seek further growth abroad. On the other side of the Atlantic 
have the widely discussed ABN Amro / Antonveneta and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
/ Banca Nazionale del Lavoro cases (while illustrating domestic resistance to pro-
competitive cross-border bank mergers) resulted in sweeping legislative changes 
strengthening the role of the competition authority in Italy. In contrast, union pressure in 
relation to the Crédit Agricole / Crédit Lyonnais merger has weakened competition policy, 
at least temporarily, requiring a clarification of policy responsibilities in France. In the light 
of our general analysis, we also present case studies of these particularly interesting 
episodes. 
We collect a unique data set on legislative changes affecting the review of M&As in 19 
industrial countries (United States, Canada and seventeen European countries) between 
1987 and 2004. The data set covers the introduction of competition laws and competition 
authorities (both in banking and other sectors) as well as changes in the relative 
responsibilities of competition and supervisory authorities in bank merger reviews. 
Our analysis finds striking differences between the impact of legislative changes on 
banks and firms. Legislative changes strengthening competition policy decrease the 
valuations of firms, but increase the market valuations of banks. The decrease in valuations 
of firms is expected: A more proactive competition policy and more intense competition 
should lead to the erosion of profits. On the other hand, a merger review policy oriented 
more towards competition has a special and non-standard positive effect on bank stocks. 
8
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A cross-section analysis of the cumulative abnormal bank stock returns identifies the 
variables that drive the positive reaction. We pay particular attention to the different 
regulatory framework faced by banks and non-financial firms, namely that bank mergers are 
not only subject to competition reviews but also to supervisory reviews. The less 
transparent the supervisory reviews in a given country are, i.e., when the supervisory 
decisions are not published, the higher the valuation gains of banks. 
Our results show that the effects of the reorientation of the legal and institutional 
environment towards more competition in banking will be heavily influenced by the 
supervisory regime. In particular, supervisory reviews of bank mergers are often guided by 
other objectives and approaches than competition reviews. They typically focus on the 
soundness and stability of the new entity created.
2 Moreover, supervisory intervention 
occasionally promotes specific mergers in order to save weak or failing banks.
3 As a result, 
these interventions are usually not driven by competition and efficiency considerations. And 
this may be even more so in less transparent supervisory systems. Investors will penalize 
banks for these sources of inefficiency with a lower valuation. As competition reviews gain 
                                                 
2 The Second Banking Directive in the European Union states that national bank supervisors “shall refuse 
authorization (of mergers; insertion by the authors) if, taking into account the need to ensure the sound and 
prudent management of a credit institution, they are not satisfied as to the suitability of the … shareholders” 
(EC (1989), article 5). The US Bank Merger Act stipulates in paragraph 1828 that “In every case, the 
responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of 
the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served” (see 
also the Bank Holding Company Act, paragraph 1842). The Federal Reserve Board considers particularly 
capital adequacy, but also asset quality, earnings performance and other aspects under this provision. The 
Basel Committee core principle 5 refers to the requirement that “banking supervisors have the authority to 
establish criteria for … ensuring that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks 
or hinder effective supervision”. The core principles list ownership structures; operating plan, systems of 
control and internal organization; fit and proper tests of directors and senior managers; and financial 
projections including capital as aspects to be considered in this regard. Overall, practice has shown that the 
room for interpretation in this area can be very wide. 
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importance and as the supervisory setup becomes more transparent, the room for less 
efficiency-oriented transactions vanishes and bank valuations may increase. 
In other words, the strengthening of competition policy seems to generate important 
positive externalities in the financial system that limit supervisory discretion in determining 
merger outcomes and thereby offset unintended adverse side effects on efficiency 
introduced through supervisory policies focusing on prudential considerations and financial 
stability. More generally, legal arrangements governing competition and supervisory control 
of bank mergers seem to have important implications for bank and firm performance in the 
economy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related literature in Section 
II and provide details on the past and existing institutional arrangements for competition 
policy in Section III. In that section we also present the results of an empirical analysis of 
the effects of the legislative changes that strengthen competition policy. We study both the 
effects on stock market valuations of banks and (non-financial) firms. Here we also discuss 
a few important bank merger episodes that had a strong bearing on legislative changes. In 
Section IV we first address the institutional arrangements for specific supervisory policies 
in banking and then investigate how the stock market valuations of individual banks are 
explained by institutional and policy features characterizing merger reviews in the various 
countries. We conclude in Section V. Appendices 1 and 2 provide details about the sources 
from which we derived our unique dataset. Appendix 3 gives more details about the events 
around the ABN Amro / Antonveneta case. 
10
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II. Related Literature 
In addition to the general discussion on the specialness of banks and the value of 
competition in banking, our work is related to a number of strands in the literature. First, 
our paper is connected to research dealing with the causes and consequences of banking 
consolidation (see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) for a detailed survey). With the 
available data it seems hard to identify efficiency gains in bank mergers, except for gains in 
mergers among relatively small banks (Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Wheelock and 
Wilson (2001)) or efficiencies obtained in risk management (Hughes and Mester (1998)). 
On the other hand, the consequences of consolidation are sharper in focus. Consolidation 
may soften competition and shrink loan supply (unless accompanied by de novo bank entry 
as documented by Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998)), modify individual and 
aggregate liquidity (Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo (2006)), and increase bank riskiness 
(Boyd and Runkle (1993), Demsetz and Strahan (1997)). However this literature has so far 
mostly overlooked the effects of (changes in) the merger review procedures on the 
consolidation process (except for a discussion in Carletti and Hartmann (2003)), an issue 
this paper addresses. 
Second, our paper fits in a literature that deals with the effects of financial regulation on 
banks and real activity. Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992), among others, 
analyze how capital requirements affect the behavior of banks. They show, inter alia, that 
inaccurate risk weights distort banks’ investment decisions. Merton (1977) argues that 
deposit insurance may cause moral hazard and excessive risk-taking and Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2002) for example provide empirical evidence of such effects. Blum and 
Hellwig (1995) model how capital requirements may amplify business cycles, an issue 
recently gaining prominence in relation to the implementation of the Basel II capital 
11
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standards (Kashyap and Stein (2004)). Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), Demirguc-Kunt, 
Laeven and Levine (2004), and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) provide evidence that 
too restrictive banking regulations can lead to substantial costs in terms of growth and 
welfare, while Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) document that banking regulation in its 
implementation and supervisory interventions are not seldom the cause of substantial 
inefficiencies in financial systems, in particular in developing countries.
4 Also this literature 
has not yet addressed the effects of the arrangements for supervisory reviews of bank 
mergers highlighted in this paper. 
Finally, a by now vast literature addresses the role of the legal architecture for the 
functioning of financial systems. In their seminal work La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997, (1998) have illustrated the influence of legal origins, formalism, and 
enforcement problems on the structure and efficiency of a financial system (also Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 
(2006)). While Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that legal origin and shareholder rights 
influence the volume of M&As (across all sectors) and the direction of cross-border deals, 
the impact of changes in competition policy on merger activity, despite its importance, has 
not yet been investigated. 
                                                 
4 Quintyn and Taylor (2003) for example stress the importance of good governance for the well functioning of 
bank regulators and supervisors. Recent empirical work by Donzé (2006) documents a correlation between 
measures of supervisory independence and adherence to law and banking sector health. 
12
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III.  The Impact of Changes in Competition Policy 
Our point of departure is a fundamental policy shift observed in many industrial countries 
over the last decades, i.e., the introduction or strengthening of general competition policy. 
Such a shift is by definition mostly exogenous to changes or policies in any individual 
sector, and hence particularly attractive for analyzing the specialness of banks. Moreover, 
the literature – as cited above – has brought up a number of reasons why competition may 
play a different role in banking than in other sectors. We focus in particular on 
concentrations. Continuing substantial financial consolidation renders them particularly 
important and the competition reviews of M&As are complemented in banking by 
supervisory reviews (see section IV). The ultimate objective of the present section is 
therefore to find out whether banks are affected differently or in the same fashion as other 
firms by general changes in competition control of M&As. 
A.  Competition Control of Mergers and Acquisitions 
In most countries formal competition policies conducted by specific authorities are a 
relatively recent phenomenon. In stark contrast to the United States, where competition 
policy started with the 1890 Sherman and 1914 Clayton Acts, and Germany, where it was 
formalized with the Gesetz gegen Wettebewerbeschaenkungen in 1958, most countries did 
not introduce systematic competition policy until the early 1990s. In all cases, the 
introduction of competition policy constituted a significant change for the countries 
involved. 
The main objective of controlling M&As from a competition perspective is to prevent 
excessive market concentration. The concern is that concentration could lead to a 
13
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substantial lessening of competition or the creation (or strengthening) of a dominant 
position, which would increase prices and reduce consumer welfare through market power.  
To avoid this from happening competition authorities tend to apply a number of criteria 
to review merger proposals. The most frequently used competition criteria include the 
degree of concentration of the relevant markets (measured through either parties’ combined 
market share or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index),
5 the possibility of entry and the presence 
of potential entrants, and the evolution of the market and of the parties’ market shares in the 
years before the proposed transaction. In some countries it is also evaluated whether 
efficiency gains, e.g. through scale, would offset any price impacts of an increase in 
concentration (the so-called efficiency defense). An important factor is also whether other 
than competition criteria can or have to be taken into account. In particular, the competition 
laws of countries often contain a provision that allow the competent authorities to weigh 
competition considerations against other presumed social or political benefits, such as the 
preservation of employment, technical achievements or certain services in a specific region. 
A related issue is the so-called failing firm defense, which is sometimes based on 
competition grounds and sometimes on social benefits. In the financial sector, e.g., some 
competitive disadvantages are sometimes accepted in order to prevent a costly bank failure 
through a merger. 
In countries with developed competition regimes, policies tend to be conducted by a 
separate competition authority. The strength of the competition authority in taking merger 
decisions varies across countries. In some countries the antitrust authority or the courts can 
                                                 
5 There is ample empirical work on the impact of bank market concentration on bank loan and deposit rates. 
Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich (2004), Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) and Degryse and Ongena 
(2006), for example, review recent methodologies and results. Most studies find a positive / negative impact of 
market concentration on loan / deposit rates, though the magnitude of the effect varies widely. 
14
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take the decisions alone. In other countries the decision-making power is shared with other 
authorities, such as multiple antitrust authorities or the ministry of finance. Again in other 
countries ministries or special sector regulators, such as sometimes the case in banking, are 
in charge. The strength of the responsible authority is also influenced by the fact whether 
another authority can intervene, take over the review process or overturn decisions. 
A last component of the competition policy regime is the process of merger reviews. In 
most countries they follow similar steps in that a merger is notified to the competent 
authority (if large enough),
6 then it is decided whether the case has the potential to raise 
competition concerns and if this is the case the specific transaction is reviewed. Basically in 
all countries this process tends to be highly transparent in that the decisions reached are 
made public. 
In many countries competition policy was rather dramatically strengthened during the last 
three decades in its objective, criteria, authority and/or process design. We study now these 
particular moments of change. 
B.  Data, Institutional Variables and Events 
We use the event study approach to analyze the effects of the introduction and 
strengthening of competition policy, henceforth, “changes (in competition policy)”, in 
industrial countries.
7 In order to identify the events, we collect detailed information on the 
                                                 
6 In some countries notification is voluntary, but the competition authority can unravel a case ex post if it turns 
out to create a dominant market position. 
7 The interpretation of results from an event study requires that the events are exogenous. We conjecture that 
banks cannot decisively lobby and influence a strengthening of competition policy that is applicable to all 
sectors. Nevertheless, we check this point of departure. For example, the results we present later in the paper 
do not differ between countries with large versus small banking sectors (proxied by total bank credit / GDP 
with a cutoff of 150 %), a possible measure of lobbying power. Granted, the introduction of competition 
policy itself could be driven by developments in the domestic or neighboring economies, and the timing of the 
introduction of competition policy may be determined by country size (Forslid, Hackner and Muren (2005)). 
However, we study the differential effect on the banking sector within a short time frame. 
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legislative changes affecting the setup for competition reviews of M&As in the European 
Union (EU) and 18 individual countries: the United States and Canada, 14 EU countries, 
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and two non-EU countries, 
Switzerland and Norway. We focus on the time period January 1, 1987 to July 1, 2004 
during which most of the changes occurred. 
We relied on multiple sources. In a first step, we obtained and analyzed the exact text of 
all relevant legislation and regulation to identify the changes that took place over time. In a 
second step, we scrutinized the many publicly available reports on merger control to check 
our interpretation of the events (Appendix 1 contains a comprehensive list). Finally, we 
directly contacted experts of the various institutions dealing with merger control across all 
countries (Appendix 2 contains the list of agencies we contacted). We engaged these 
contacts, often in multiple and prolonged written and verbal communications, to confirm 
our understanding and “coding” of the data, to seek clarifications and corrections and to 
identify the most important aspects of merger control in practice. 
A key contribution of the paper is to aggregate the information we collected and to 
construct various indexes capturing the crucial dimensions of the competition control of 
mergers and acquisitions (and of the supervisory control in the banking sector, as we will 
describe in more detail below). Four dimensions (which we formulate as the answers to 
four questions) shape the merger policy regime of any country:  
￿ What assessment criteria are used in competition control? 
￿ Who is (are) the decision-making agency(ies) for competition control?  
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￿ Is merger notification mandatory above (statutory) thresholds? 
We construct the four variables labeled Competition Criteria, Competition Enforcer, 
Competition Overturning, and Mandatory Notification respectively with answers to the 
questions ranging between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to a more 
competition-oriented design and implementation of competition control. Our ranking of the 
answers reflects the simple idea that the merger review is more-competition oriented (at 
least from an ex ante perspective) when it has the single, narrower objective of preventing 
restrictions of competition, it is enforced by a single, independent agency, no other agency 
can intervene in the process and notification is mandatory. We report the coded answers to 
the questions at the beginning and at the end of our sample period in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The table shows the heterogeneity of the competition policy across the different countries 
and the substantial changes that occurred over time.
8 For example, the period between 
1987:01 and 2004:07 saw the EU introduce competition control that (1) employs only 
competition criteria, (2) is enforced by a single antitrust authority (the DG Competition of 
the European Commission), (3) whose decisions can only be overturned ex post on a case-
specific basis, and (4) is operating under mandatory notification. 
                                                 
8 The precise institutional arrangements in some countries differ slightly for the banking sector, again attesting 
to the specialness of the sector. However, the changes during our sample period were almost always 
introduced simultaneously across all sectors, with the exception of changes that were introduced in France, 
Netherlands and Portugal. None of these cases, however, turn out to be relevant for our analysis. In France the 
banking sector was perceived to be subject to the competition control of mergers and acquisitions according to 
the Competition Law of July 1977 until the Supreme Court stated on May 16, 2003 that the banking sector 
was not subject to any competition control (we return to this case later in the paper). In the Netherlands, the 
Competition Act of 22 May 1997 did not apply to the banking sector (art. 32) but only temporarily for two 
years (art. 107.3). In Portugal merger control was introduced in all sectors except banking with the decree-law 
n. 428/88 of 19 November 1988. Bank mergers and acquisitions became subject to control only with the law 
18/2003 approved in date April 10, 2003, which substantially reformed the merger control also for all the 
other sectors after a new, independent authority was created. However, for lack of readily accessible stock 
market data we drop the 1988 event and include only the 2003 sector-wide event. 
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The changes in any of the four key variables across the sample period define our set of 
events. Note however that for simplicity the table reports the answers to the questions only 
at the beginning and end of our time sample, thus under-representing the number of changes 
that occurred. 
C.  Dating 
The precise dating of the changes in competition laws regulating the control of mergers 
and acquisitions across the sample countries, combined with information on stock prices, 
are the main ingredients of our empirical investigation. Figure 1 displays the main steps in 
most legislative procedures and the corresponding dates we use in our study.
9 
We divide the legislative process in three phases: approval, publication and 
implementation. Approval refers to the date of approval by either the Parliament or the 
Head of State. When available, we collect from our sources and contacts the earliest date in 
the official approval process. For example, in a bi-cameral parliamentary system we use the 
first date when one of the chambers approves the law. Publication refers to the date when 
the legislation is published in the country’s official journal; and Implementation is the 
official date when the legislation enters into force. The process leading up to 
implementation varies substantially across countries and type of legislation. In general, a 
law comes into force either after a certain (fixed) time period starting from the day when it 
is published or following a decree implementing it. In the latter case, the process may 
contain more uncertainty, as some aspects of the policy regime may be specified in the 
implementing decree only. 
                                                 
9 The legislative steps in Figure 1 reflect the general procedure. In practice the procedure may vary slightly 
across countries. For example, in some countries (such as Finland) the approval of the Head of State is not 
required. These differences do not affect our analysis. 
18
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 786
July 2007 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To capture the earliest time investors can reasonable be expected to infer that legislation 
will change and how, we study the stock price reaction around the earliest official date we 
have information about.
10 We consolidate the dates in this way for obvious reasons. The 
process of legislative codification varies substantially across countries. In some countries 
the official date of a law is the approval date (typically the approval by the Head of State), 
in other countries it is actually the publication or even the implementation date. Not taking 
these differences across countries into consideration, one risks analyzing investors’ 
reactions to widely divergent information sets. By focusing on the earliest official date with 
information context (i.e., often the approval in one of the chambers of the legislature), we 
aim to harmonize the information investors have about the outcome of the legislative 
process across countries. Thus, we complement the 16 approval dates with 4 publication 
dates to obtain 20 Event dates. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 lists the 20 event dates and the changes in competition policy that occurred. The 
table shows that, in many instances, the new law simultaneously strengthened several 
dimensions of merger control at once (an additional reason not to link the event selection 
criteria to the outcomes). The table also includes characteristics of the supervisory policy 
regime in place at the time of the changes in competition policy. We will discuss the 
dimensions of supervisory merger control more in detail later in the paper. 
Once the event dates are selected, we analyze the impact of the changes not only on the 
event dates themselves, but also during a reasonable period preceding them. We are aware 
                                                 
10 The precise dating in regulatory event studies of the change in the investors’ expectations is of paramount 
importance. As recommended by Binder (1985) we will also link the excess return to country and bank 
characteristics further in the paper. 
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that most major legislation is typically prepared in parliamentary committees before it is 
brought to a chamber floor, hence the preceding period captures the investors’ potential 
reaction to the entire political debate and process preceding and surrounding any important 
committee work (party manifestos, government agreements, public lobby group 
endorsements, etc.). Furthermore, as the process of codification unfolds differently in each 
country, we believe it is also crucial to analyze not only the impact during the period 
following the event dates but also the periods surrounding the other dates we identified in 
the legislative process. In particular, we also analyze the stock price reactions around the 20 
implementation dates to capture investors’ possible reactions to “last-minute details” that 
are specified in the implementation process of legislative changes (such as the precise 
mandates, chairmanship and membership of committees and institutions, operational 
regulations, etc.). 
D.  Event Study Methodology 
How do changes in laws governing competition policy affect the market valuations of 
both firms and banks? To try to answer this question we start by employing daily sector and 
total market price indices for the 18 countries and the EU-15 region and the Morgan Stanley 
All Country World Index from Datastream.
11 The data runs from January 1, 1987 to July 1, 
2004, the period for which we analyzed the institutional changes. The indices capture all 
listed firms in the respective category and are value-weighted. 
We estimate daily abnormal returns using standard market model regressions. We regress 
the daily returns for index j, rjt, on a measure of the market return, rmt, and two event 
                                                 
11 The bank indices have the Datastream code BANKSCC, where CC stands for the respective two-digit 
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t = -250-τ, -249-τ, ..., 249+τ, 250+τ. 
Our two event windows contain between 5 and 241 trading days, i.e., we vary τ between 
2 and 120. The coefficients 
before
j γ  and 
after
j γ measure daily abnormal returns during the 
event periods before and after the event. The market model is estimated over a period 
starting (-250-τ) days before the event and ending (250+τ) days after the event.
12 
For the results reported in the paper, we a priori choose to use the value-weighted index 
of all stocks in the country as a proxy for the market return, by itself or in combination with 
the EU-15 Market Index, and the Morgan Stanley All Country World Index. 
For each event the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the estimated coefficients 
before
j γˆ  and 
after
j γˆ . For each event we estimate daily abnormal returns for both the domestic 
index of non-financial institutions (“firms”) and the domestic bank index (“banks”). We 
calculate the average and standard deviations of the CARs across the set of events and 
perform a standard t-test to assess statistical significance. We also report the number of 
positives and negatives and perform a standard sign test. 
The independence of the events could be a potential concern. However, employing a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit test we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
exact event dates (reported later) are uniformly distributed across the entire sample period. 
We also regress the CARs on various specifications including a time trend, and again we 
                                                 
12 We a priori choose for a long estimation window around the event, as we are concerned about the impact of 
the changes in regulation on market risk (Grout and Zalewska (2006)). We check the robustness of the results 
to alternative estimation windows, the (-250-τ, τ) window for example, and time-varying market betas. 
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cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the trend variables are equal to 
zero. 
We further assess the difference between the CARs of both indices by simply performing 
a t-test assuming unequal variances and a sign test based on the number of differences that 
are positives or negatives. Finally, we perform the more general Fisher’s exact probability 
test of independence to detect differences between firms and banks in the signs of their 
reaction.
13 
E.  Wealth Impact of Changes in Competition Policy 
The results of the event study for the stock indexes of firms and banks averaged across 
events are reported in Table 3. For brevity, we report only various windows within the 
interval [-120,120] around the legislative changes as identified by the earlier defined event 
and implementation dates. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
We immediately note two striking features of Table 3. First, most of the significant 
results lie in the windows before and including the event date. This should not come as a 
surprise given our dating strategy. As described before, we select the earliest available date 
of the legislative process as the event date, so that the most significant reaction is expected 
to occur immediately before and on this date. Alternatively, the fact that investors appear to 
react most strongly in these windows confirms the accurateness of our dating strategy. 
Second, there are sporadically some significant reactions in the windows preceding and 
including the implementation date, although much less than for the event dates. This can 
                                                 
13 See NIST/SEMATECH (2006), for example, for details on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit test 
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also be easily understood since, as already mentioned, implementation in some cases 
removes lingering doubts about the introduction and actual modus operandi of the new 
piece of legislation. Thus, the overall results show that investors anticipate and immediately 
react to the outcomes of the legislative changes so that no further effects are present after 
the event and the implementation dates. 
The changes in competition policy have important economic effects for both the real and 
the banking sector. Changes in competition policy lead on average to a decrease in non-
financial firms’ stock prices and to an increase in banks’ stock prices. The difference 
between these banks and firms reactions is positive and highly significant (we report 
significance levels for both standard t-tests and sign tests). The difference is also 
economically relevant, reaching the value of 1.1%*, 3.3%**, 7.6%*** and 11.1%*, 
respectively for the 2, 20, 60 and 120 day windows before and including the event date.
14 
Both the sign test on the differences and the more general Fisher’s test of independence 
indicate that firm and bank stocks differ in the direction of their reaction. 
The impact around the implementation of changes in competition policy is weaker. 
Excess returns on firm stocks before implementation are negative but only marginally 
statistically significant. And neither bank stock returns nor the differences between banks 
and firms, though consistently positive and economically relevant before implementation, 
are statistically significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
We report the results by event for each country in Table 4 for the 2, 20 and 60-day 
windows before and including the event date. As the sign tests already indicated, almost all 
events lead to a decrease in firms’ stock prices and to an increase in banks’ stock prices. 
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Concerning banks, we notice a negative effect of the changes in competition policy only for 
the European Union, the Netherlands and Sweden.
15 
F.  Robustness 
Before trying to explain this remarkable differential impact of the introduction and 
strengthening in competition policy on firm and bank stocks, we subject our findings to a 
variety of robustness checks. We report key results in the lower three panels in Table 3. We 
first report results using (1) the value-weighted index of all stocks in the country in 
combination with the EU-15 Market Index, and (2) the Morgan Stanley All Country World 
Index as proxies for the market return. Results are almost unaffected. We also check our 
key results using reasonable combinations of the domestic, EU-15, and world indices with 
the MS All Country Non Financial Index and the MS All Country Bank Index. Results are 
again almost unaffected and we choose not to report these results. We further alter our 
estimation window. In particular we estimate the beta coefficients using only pre-event 
stock returns. Again, results are unaffected and we choose not to report these findings. 
                                                                                                                                                     
14 As in the tables, *** means significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
15 Possible explanations can be found in the institutional details in each of these countries. The negative effect 
for the European Union can be explained by the possibility that exists for states to use prudential rules as 
legitimate interests. Hence states can interfere with the decisions of the Commission and pursue objectives 
other than competition and efficiency (art. 21(3) of the Council Regulation N. 4064/89 and subsequent 
modifications). Portugal attempted to use this possibility to prevent a foreign takeover in the much-debated 
Champalinaud - Santander case in 1999.
 The negative reaction of banks’ stock prices in the Netherlands may 
be due to the (possibly unexpected) delay of two years in the introduction of the competition policy in the 
banking sector relative to the other sectors (art. 32 and 108.3 of the Competition Act approved in date March 
20, 1997). The delay prolonged the influence of the Minister of Finance on the concentration of economic 
power in the banking sector according to the Act on the Supervision of the Credit System of 1992 until 
January 2000. The negative response of banks’ stock prices in Sweden may be more closely related to the 
interaction between competition and supervisory policy. As we will explain more in detail below, supervisory 
decisions are transparent in Sweden and informal notification is not coded in the regulation. This leaves little 
scope in theory for the potential positive externality of competition control on supervisory control. The 
negative result may indicate the investors’ anticipation of the strict application of competition policy in light 
of the oligopolistic structure of the Sweden banking sector. It is curious to note an insignificant effect of the 
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Finally, we also turn to individual bank stocks (we return to using individual bank stocks 
in Section V), though a priori we choose to assess sector indices for reasons of coverage, 
selection, and relevant value weighing. We again estimate a market model employing the 
value-weighted index of all stocks in the country as a proxy for the market return. 
Averaging across the banks within each country and then across events we obtain average 
CARs for the [-60,0], [-20,0] and [-2,0] windows of respectively 4.28%**, 1.17%, and –
0.03% for the changes in competition policy events. Averaging across the 323 individual 
bank stocks the average CARs equal respectively 1.95%**, 0.59%, and 0.14%* for the 
same set of windows. 
To summarize, firms stocks decrease and bank stocks increase in anticipation and upon 
the approval of changes strengthening competition policy. We now briefly discuss in light 
of this relationship two widely publicized bank merger episodes that led to clarifications of 
existing legislation or legislative changes and then study the characteristics of the mergers 
that actually took place before and after the implementation of the changes, before arriving 
in Section IV at an explanation for these curious findings. 
G.  Two Case Studies and an Analysis of the Characteristics of Mergers 
1.  France Anno 2003 
When Crédit Agricole made a takeover bid for the ailing former state bank Crédit 
Lyonnais in December 2002, the French banking landscape – as it became clear later – was 
characterized by some ambiguity as to how strong competition policy was in this sector and 
which authority was in charge of it. In this situation the Comité des Etablissements de 
Credit et des Enterprises d’Investissement (CECEI) – the supervisory authority in charge of 
licensing banks – took the initiative to also conduct a competition review of the transaction. 
The CECEI authorized it in March 2003, but at the same time came to the conclusion that 
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the new group would acquire dominant positions in a number of local retail markets and 
made the divestiture of 85 out of 9,275 branches and the “freeze” in the number of branches 
in certain regions a condition. 
Concerned about the related loss of employment, a union (the Fédération des employés et 
cadres) and two employees challenged the decision in front of the Conseil de l’Etat, the 
French supreme court for administrative justice, on the grounds that the CECEI had not the 
competence for competition reviews of bank mergers and therefore could not impose the 
above conditions. On May 16
th, 2003, the Conseil de l’Etat confirmed the view of the 
plaintiffs and declared the conditions imposed for competition reasons invalid but not the 
decision to approve the transaction (from a supervisory perspective). 
This ruling implied an unexpected weakening of competition policy in France. Given the 
extraordinary and judicial character of this case we choose not to include it in our original 
set. We check, however, whether the stock market reactions observed on the event date are 
consistent with our findings about legislative changes. Given the weakening of competition 
policy, one would expect negative abnormal returns for bank stocks and, perhaps, positive 
abnormal returns for firm stocks. The results of such an extra event study are reported at the 
bottom of Table 3. It turns out that the 3-day bank and firm CARs in the interval [-2,0] 
equal –0.77*** and 0.11**, respectively. Bank CARs following the event are negative, 
economically relevant, though never more than marginally significant. Hence, the Crédit 
Agricole/Crédit Lyonnais episode is fully in line with our results on legislative changes. 
2.  Italy Anno 2005 
Our second case attracted even greater international attention. In the beginning of 2005, 
the Dutch bank ABN AMRO and the Spanish bank Banco Santander Central Hispano were 
bidding for the Italian banks Banca Antioniana Populare Veneta (Antonveneta or BAPV) 
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and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), respectively. It was widely perceived that the 
Italian supervisory authority did not take a fully impartial attitude between the foreign and 
domestic bidders, supposedly for prudential reasons. This gave some advantages to the 
domestic bidders Banca Populare Italiana (BPI, formerly Banca Populare di Lodi) and 
Unipol, respectively. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 3 focuses on the events related to the Antonveneta case and plots the cumulative 
abnormal returns on the Italian bank stock index during 2005. On February 8
th, 2005, the 
EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, Mr Charlie McCreevy, publicly warned the 
Governor of the Banca d’Italia, Mr Antonio Fazio, not to block foreign bank takeovers (see 
the most left-hand side vertical arrow). Following this warning, the Italian bank stock index 
started a remarkable trend upwards, possibly in expectation of the eventual passage of a law 
(that had been idling in Parliament for a long time already) that would transfer the 
responsibility for competition reviews of bank mergers away from the bank supervisor. 
While the increase in cumulative abnormal bank stock returns came to a halt in mid 
2005, the intervention of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, criticizing the Banca d’Italia 
Governors’ handling of the case and asking for his resignation in September 2005, led the 
index to resume its steady climb. The resignation of the Governor and head of the 
supervisory authority, on December 19
th, and the remarkably swift passage of the law in the 
Italian Parliament that transferred the responsibility for competition reviews of bank 
mergers from the supervisor to the Italian antitrust authority, two days later, marked the 
poignant closures of the run-up. 
The visual impression of the Italian bank stock prices reacting to the identified events is 
broadly corroborated by the event study reported in the table at the bottom of Figure 3 
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(Appendix 3 provides more details on the key events).
16 The Commissioner’s clarion call in 
early February gave a signal to investors that bank merger policy in Italy would ultimately 
change. After temporary setbacks, change arrived with the introduction of a law, 
strengthening competition considerations in bank merger reviews, and a new top 
management for the supervisor in December 2005. Overall, it seems that the pressures on 
the supervisory authority led investors to think that the implied or emerging constraints on 
prudential policy would increase the value of listed Italian banks. So, also our second case 
is fully in line with the results on legislative changes strengthening competition policy. 
3.  Mergers Before and After the Changes in Competition Control 
Finally, we study a comprehensive merger date set to analyze whether the 
implementation of changes in competition policy affected the characteristics of the M&A 
transactions.
17 While the characteristics of M&As among firms are not altered much as a 
result of the changes in competition policy, the characteristics of banks engaging in M&As 
differ quite dramatically. In particular bank targets more than double in common equity or 
total assets and more than triple in net income.
18 Not surprisingly, the value of the 
transaction in bank M&As also doubles, but the percentage of the shares that is acquired 
and the percentage shares owned after the deal seem mostly unaffected. 
                                                 
16 We regress daily bank stock index returns on a constant, daily national market index returns, and event 
period dummies. The estimation period starts on March 16
th, 2002, and ends on March 15
th, 2006. 
17 We start from SDC Platinum data and complement it with additional bank merger and acquisitions records 
obtained from competition and supervisory authorities in the sample countries. This allows us to increase the 
number of records for bank mergers by more than 10% in the event countries. The augmented data set 
contains in total 15,148 bank M&A records and 101,441 firm M&A records for the 18 sample countries and 
the EU during the period January 1
st, 1990 to June 1
st, 2004. We study the changes in more than hundred firm, 
bank, and deal characteristics in the 250, 750 and 1,500 days before and after the implementation (event) 
dates. We test the difference in characteristics between before and after for banks and firms and between the 
two groups. To control for country specific time trends we assess the significance of these differences by 
comparing the actual differences with a distribution of differences drawn randomly with replacement within 
the sample period (100 draws). Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Overall it seems that the introduction and the strengthening of competition policy 
“encourages” bank M&As with larger and more profitable target banks, while leaving the 
firm M&As mostly unaffected. How to square this increase in bank target size in the years 
around the implementation of the changes in competition policy with the positive excess 
returns on bank stocks in the days preceding and upon their approval? Target excess returns 
are typically lower for larger deal sizes (see Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)), 
suggesting that investors do not only react to the expected increase in target size but also to 
the increased likelihood that banks of a certain range profitability become potential 
targets.
19 
IV.  Explaining the Special Effect on Banks 
We now turn to explaining the differential effects between firms and banks in terms of 
both the results of the event study, and the changes in the type of M&As before and after 
the regulatory amendments. Why do banks react differently? What are the factors pushing 
up their stock prices? As is the case for the other sectors, the introduction of competition 
policy in the banking sector should prevent excessive market power, thus reducing future 
monopoly profits and stock prices.
20 Why does the same not happen in the banking sector? 
Why do bank targets grow in size and profitability? What is “special” here? 
To tackle these questions, we regress individual bank CARs on a number of key variables 
capturing institutional aspects of supervisory and competition policy regimes, general 
                                                                                                                                                     
18 The increase in profitability cannot be fully disentangled from the pure size effect most likely due to a data 
coverage problem. 
19 Anticipated components of returns around policy changes may be substantial (for example Becher (2006)). 
Bank target excess returns around the actual merger announcements in our augmented SDC dataset increase 
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institutional quality and individual bank characteristics. Before reporting the results, we 
discuss below our economic hypotheses and the variables used to test them. Table 5 
provides an overview of all the variables used. 
A.  The Supervisory Control of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Banking 
Sector 
A crucial difference between the banking sector and most other sectors is that banks are, 
for the reasons listed in the introduction, subject to special regulations and supervision. This 
includes special supervisory reviews of bank mergers to ensure the soundness and stability 
of the new entities. So, we start to look for explanations for the banks’ unusual response to 
legislative changes strengthening competition policy with the institutional features related 
to this fact. Moreover, in most countries competition control of mergers was introduced in 
an environment where financial regulation and supervision already existed. So, competition 
reviews had to be “conform” with supervisory reviews. This could possibly introduce 
important “dialectics” between the agencies enforcing the two (see also Carlton and Picker 
(2006)). The balancing of objectives is reflected in the “resolution of conflicts”, the 
procedure each country follows when the two reviews lead to different outcomes. In 
general, the resolution procedure may require that bank mergers can be implemented only if 
they pass both reviews, or the procedure may stipulate that in case of conflict a third agency 
(typically a ministry) takes the final decision weighing the arguments put forth in both 
reviews. Carletti and Hartmann (2003) discuss these procedures in detail for major 
industrial countries. Last, competition policy in the banking sector may equal to other 
sectors or differ from them.  
                                                                                                                                                     
20 In addition, the restrictive effect of competition policy on bank concentration should spur growth in other 
sectors (Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) for example). 
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Similar to the discussion on institutional features of competition policy in Section III, we 
can structure the institutional features of supervisory merger reviews according to the 
objectives and criteria applied, the authorities in charge and the review processes. The first 
aspect is captured by a variable Supervisory Criteria, which indicates whether supervisory 
bank merger reviews focus entirely on prudential and stability considerations or whether 
there are also other criteria. The hypothesis would be that more focus on stability (a higher 
value of the variable) leads to more positive bank CARs. The second aspect is covered by a 
variable Supervisory Enforcer. This variable takes on the value of one when a specialist 
supervisory authority conducts the supervisory merger reviews. Lower values of it indicate 
that an authority that is less focused on stability and prudential concerns or less independent 
in this regard conducts the reviews. Again, the hypothesis is that in the presence of a more 
specialist authority positive bank CARs would be larger. We provide summary statistics of 
all variables in Table 5. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
As regards the supervisory review process we surmise that the transparency and the 
procedural independence of it may be relevant for the investors’ assessment. We construct 
two variables that capture the information we collected on the private nature of its formal 
decisions and on the requirement of informal notification of the supervisory agency (before 
formal notification). 
The first variable, Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public, can be seen as the degree of 
transparency of the supervisory decisions, and therefore as a proxy of the discretion which 
can be used in the supervisory process. If the decisions following a formal supervisory 
control are public, the discretion of the supervisory process should be reduced. This may 
also facilitate balancing competition and stability considerations in merger decisions in that 
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a third agency (e.g., a Ministry) or generally the public can appropriately weight the 
arguments put forward in both reviews. 
Overall then the fact that decisions are public increases the transparency of the regulatory 
process and therefore the predictability of the outcomes, leading to the hypothesis that bank 
CARs increase. In this respect, we note that whereas the competition review process is 
typically very transparent and ends with public formal decisions in all countries of our 
sample, the decisions on supervisory controls are public only in a few countries (Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, the US, and to some extent in Canada and the UK). 
The second variable, Supervisory Informal Notification, captures the possibility that the 
supervisory control precedes, at least at an informal level, the competition control. To the 
extent that mergers can be blocked or at least discouraged during this phase, this variable 
indicates the potential for the supervisory control to have exclusive power over bank merger 
decisions. 
To conclude, all the considerations above suggest that the stock prices of banks should 
increase at the announcement of changes in the competition policy when the supervisory 
controls are important in the merger decisions. The more independent and focused on 
stability supervisory reviews are, the less transparent and the stronger vis-à-vis competition 
reviews, the less competition and efficiency may play a role. Whilst this could make the 
banking sector more stable, it could also have unintended side effects on the efficiency of 
the consolidation process, thereby reducing from an ex ante perspective the valuation of 
banks in the stock market. The strengthening of competition policy in banking, whose 
primary focus is on competition and efficiency, could then counteract these adverse effects. 
Provided that the associated efficiency gains are stronger than the profits lost through 
greater competition, bank valuations in the stock market would increase. In other words, the 
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strengthening of competition control may extend a positive externality on the financial 
sector and this externality may be the stronger the greater is the conflict between 
competition policy and supervisory policy. 
B.  Other Issues 
We include in our cross-sectional analysis several explanatory variables capturing other 
potential explanations for the positive reactions of banks CARs to the regulatory 
amendments. Banks can benefit more from a more competition-oriented control of M&As 
if they can claim more than non-financial firms that the merger leads to important efficiency 
gains (through economies of scale, for example) that exceed the welfare losses due to the 
increase in market power. Efficiency Defense equals one if efficiency gains are being 
explicitly considered in the merger review as a factor mitigating anticompetitive effects, 
and equals zero otherwise.
21 We include the change in this variable (∆) as a result of the 
strengthening in competition policy. Also, we interact ∆Efficiency Defense with log(Bank 
Assets), a measure of bank size, to analyze whether larger banks benefit more from a more 
efficiency-oriented review. 
Some observers claim that the introduction or the strengthening of competition policy 
could sometimes act as a collusion-enhancing device, in particular in an oligopolistic sector. 
If competition control prevents external growth for the few large banks operating in the 
market, the changes in competition policy may act as a signal of “stability” in the 
competitive structure of the sector, sustain more easily collusive behavior, and hence 
consistently with investors’ expectations result in higher future profits. To capture this 
effect, we interact ∆National Markets and C3. National Markets refers to the geographical 
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definition of the markets used in the competition reviews in the various countries (∆ again 
stands for the change in this definition as a result of the strengthening in competition 
policy), while the second variable is a simple measure of the level of concentration in the 
banking sector. Taken together, these two variables are indicative of the stringency of 
merger control and thus of the potential for collusive agreements. 
An important issue is also whether the positive bank CARs are driven by institutional 
features specific to the policies we are primarily interested in or rather by the quality of 
governmental institutions in general. In order to avoid that our institutional variables just 
pick up this general institutional quality, we introduce a proxy for the latter. This is the 
variable Corruption that accounts for the degree to which bribes, nepotism and ties between 
politics and business are prevalent in a given country.  
Finally, we include regional random effects to control for economic and financial 
development in general.
22 
C.  Results 
Table 6 reports the various specifications. Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public 
plays a key role in explaining the excess returns on individual bank stocks. The coefficient 
on this variable in Model V, for example, suggests that the introduction of competition 
control in a country where supervisory formal decisions are not public results in an excess 
return on individual bank stocks that is one and a half percent larger than the excess return 
in a country where the formal decisions are public (= (1 – 1/2) * 3.80). This effect of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
21 Merger policy can also be implicitly and informally consistent with the efficiency defense, a scenario not 
captured by our variable but only documented so far for the US (DeYoung (1991)). 
22 Regions include Scandinavia, the British Isles, Western Europe, Iberia and Southern Europe. Hausman-tests 
consistently indicate random effects are to be preferred. Results for fixed effects model are very similar and 
we report their adjusted R-squared statistics. 
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intransparency of supervisory decisions is not related to general institutional quality, since 
we control for Corruption. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public, only the coefficient on the 
variable National Markets * C3 has a fairly consistent negative sign and magnitude. Thus, 
the collusion hypothesis is strongly rejected. In contrast, having the national market as the 
geographical definition of the market used in the competition review and an already 
concentrated banking market could reduce bank stock returns, as future competition policy 
may be expected to block any additional bank mergers. None of the coefficients on the 
other variables turns out to be statistically significant and economically relevant. 
The strong result on whether supervisory decisions are public is consistent with the main 
hypothesis put forward above. The introduction or strengthening of the typically highly 
transparent competition reviews of mergers may exert a positive externality in the financial 
system, and this externality is the stronger the more intransparent the supervisory reviews 
are. The transparency of the competition reviews constrains the discretion with which the 
intransparency of supervisory reviews can be used to pursue actions that hinder the efficient 
restructuring of the banking sector. 
D.  Robustness 
In Model VI we introduce Bureaucracy Quality as an additional country control. The 
coefficient on this variable turns out not to be significant and results are further unaffected. 
Banks could further simply benefit indirectly from the introduction of or the strengthening 
of merger control in the other non-financial sectors. For example, if merger control imposes 
“binding” limits to firms’ external growth, firms are obliged to expand through greenfield 
investments rather than through M&As. To the extent that this leads to greater leverage for 
35
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 786
July 2007 
firms and thus more borrowing, banks could benefit in terms of higher profits from interest 
income. But all banks given their focus or quality may be equally placed to benefit from 
these new opportunities. Alternatively, firms may need advice and expertise to comply with 
the newly introduced or changed merger control. To the extent that banks provide this 
service, they could benefit in terms of higher fees. We test these two possibilities by 
including the variables % Interest Income/Assets and % ROA interacting them with 
log(Bank Assets) as a measure of bank size in Models VII and VIII (employing a reduced 
sample). The coefficient on Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public increases somewhat 
in size but otherwise results are unaffected. 
This basic finding also holds when Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public is 
interacted with the log of bank assets and after including all the control variables introduced 
before (we do not tabulate these results). Stocks of medium-sized banks almost always gain 
the most ground upon the changes in competition policy, presumably because investors 
expect these banks to be the most likely targets that are still acceptable to the newly 
introduced or strengthened anti-trust enforcer in banking.
23 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 7 we subject our results to a number of other straightforward robustness 
checks. In Models I and II, for example, we replace our Supervisory Enforcer measure by 
proxies for the Supervisory Independence from Banks and from Politicians respectively, 
using measures gleaned from Barth et al. (2006). The coefficients on these measures are 
not significant while results are further unaffected. The results for a wider 21-day event 
                                                 
23 Excess stock returns in a three-day window around the merger announcement of acquirers are typically 
close to zero while returns on target stocks can be around 10% to 20% (Andrade et al. (2001) for a review). 
The largest banks are likely to be either acquirers or targets unacceptable to the antitrust enforcer when 
approached by another large bank. 
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window reported in Models III to VI, though less statistically significant in general and in 
particular when all competition variables are introduced in one specification (not 
reported), broadly confirm the three-day window findings. Finally, we investigate if the 
results are robust to our ad hoc assignment of values to the competition variables in the 
model. While we surmise our ordinal rankings adequately capture our priors about the 
contours of competition control, we cannot know if our assignment of cardinal values 
equidistantly is actually appropriate. Hence, we square and (in another set of 
specifications) take the square root of all competition variables. Results are mostly 
unaffected and are not reported. 
V. Conclusion 
In the last two decades competition policy has been substantially strengthened. We use 
this exogenous policy change to identify differential reactions of banks and non-financial 
firms to them, which are informative about the widely discussed issue whether banks are 
“special” compared to other firms in the economy. 
We first document the legislative changes governing competition reviews of mergers and 
acquisitions in a sample of nineteen industrial countries over the period 1987-2004. We 
construct an event study around the announcements of such changes. We find that banks’ 
stock prices react positively to the announcement of a change strengthening competition 
policy, while those of non-financial firms react negatively. The special bank stock reactions 
are further underlined by two case studies about the bank merger episodes in France and 
Italy in 2003 and 2005, respectively, and by a balance-sheet analysis of merger targets and 
acquirers before and after the legislative changes. 
We explain the differential response of these sectors with a positive externality that the 
strengthening of competition policy can exert on the banking sector. Indeed taken together 
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the results emerging from a cross-sectional analysis suggest that the differential responses 
of banks and firms to the announcements of legislative changes in competition policy can 
be explained, at least in part, by the specific institutional environment of the banking sector. 
In particular, we document features of the supervisory framework that already existed 
before the introduction of the competition review, which may lead investors to value banks 
lower than otherwise the case. 
The focus on stability, ill-defined “sound and prudent” management provisions, an 
affinity for avoiding or deferring bank failures (Kroszner and Strahan (1996) and Brown 
and Dinc (2005)), and a penchant for confidentiality may not allow efficient restructuring 
and consolidation to take place in the banking sector. In such an environment, the typical 
negative reaction to the introduction of strong competition control for mergers (because it 
implies lower future rents and profits) may be offset by the positive effects of a better 
balancing of the above aspects with competition and efficiency considerations. The overall 
positive reaction of banks’ CARs suggests that these considerations seem to play an 
important role in investors’ evaluations. 
The great significance of a variable capturing the publication of the decisions by the 
competent authorities in the cross-section indicates that the transparency of the merger 
review process is a particular important feature in the positive externality that competition 
policy can exert in banking. The introduction of an independent and transparent control 
reduces the discretion of the regulatory process and enhances the efficiency of envisioned 
bank M&As. In particular, more profitable target banks can be engaged presumably leading 
to more efficient combinations. Investors seemingly anticipate this outcome when 
competition control is introduced. 
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Our results should not be interpreted as meaning that supervisory control is problematic 
per se or that it is generally badly implemented.
24 Rather, our results suggest that the 
objective of “sound and prudent management” pursued with the supervisory control may – 
by focusing on stability – not necessarily help for efficiency and value-enhancing decisions. 
One cannot achieve two objectives with one instrument. 
An important area for future research is to assess the stability implications of the more 
competition oriented reviews in the banking sector. As the present study only focused on 
efficiency effects, this extension of our line of research could allow for an overall welfare 
evaluation of the policy changes observed. It would also add to the active debate about 
whether there is a trade-off or complementarity between competition and stability in 
banking. 
Another interesting question is whether the strengthening in competition control similarly 
affects firms in other sectors that are also subject to special regulators (such as energy, 
health-care, and telecom for example). It should be noted, however, that if this was the case 
the special effects on banks we find would stand out even more, as the negative impact on 
non-financial firms should be higher if other special sectors were excluded from them. So, 
we do not address this in the present paper and leave the issue for future research.  
                                                 
24 Neither can one infer from our results that competition policy is always and everywhere “wholesome” and 
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APPENDIX 2. CONTACTED AGENCIES DEALING WITH COMPETITION CONTROL AND SUPERVISORY 
CONTROL OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN BANKING 
The table reports the agencies we would like to thank for helping us with the collection of the legal and institutional 
country characteristics on general competition control and supervisory control of Mergers and Acquisitions in banking. 
It is not our intention to implicate these agencies or their affiliated institutions and we consider all the remaining errors 
in the reporting as ours. For each country we order the contacts we had as follows: (1) the competition authorities, (2) 
the national supervisors and/or central banks, and if applicable (3) the European Central Bank. 
     
Country  Agency   
     
Austria  Cartel Court   
  Federal Competition Authority (of Austria)   
  Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA)   
  European Central Bank   
Belgium  Federal Public Service Economy    
  European Central Bank   
Canada  Competition Bureau   
Denmark  Danish Competition Authority   
  Danish Financial Supervisory Authority   
Finland  Finnish Competition Authority   
  European Central Bank   
France  Queen Mary and Westfield College   
  European Central Bank   
Germany  German Competition Authority   
  Deutsche Bundesbank   
  European Central Bank   
Greece  Hellenic Competition Authority   
  Bank of Greece   
  European Central Bank   
Ireland  Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment   
  Irish Competition Authority   
Italy  Italian Competition Authority   
  Bank of Italy   
Netherlands  Netherlands Competition Authority   
  Nederlandsche Bank   
Norway  Norwegian Competition Authority   
  Ministry of Finance   
  Norges Bank   
Portugal  Portuguese Competition Authority   
  European Central Bank   
Spain  Banco de Espana   
  European Central Bank   
Sweden  Swedish Competition Authority   
  Finansinspektionen   
UK  Office of Fair Trading   
  Financial Service Authority   
  European Central Bank   
US  Federal Reserve Board
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